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HOW TO MAKE THE MUCH NEEDED EMPLOYEE FREE
CHOICE ACT POLITICALLY ACCEPTABLE1
By Charles B. Craver2

I.

INTRODUCTION
American labor law has reached a critical point. Private sector union membership

has declined from 35 percent in 19543 to 7.6 percent today. 4 The National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA),5 which was enacted in 1935 to protect the rights of employees to
form, join, and assist labor organizations and to select exclusive bargaining agents to
negotiate their basic terms of employment, has become an outdated and anemic statute.
When the NLRA was passed, the U.S. was a mass production economy dominated by
relatively large corporate employers most of whose employees desired union
representation. The existing American Federation of Labor (AFL), which consisted
primarily of trade unions representing skilled craft workers, did not know how its union
affiliates could effectively organize industrial bargaining units consisting of skilled,
semi-skilled, and unskilled workers. It formed the Committee for Industrial Organization
to develop a strategic plan. AFL leaders hoped to organize employees in the automobile,
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steel, rubber, and electrical manufacturing industries and divide those individuals among
different trade unions. When it became clear to union leaders on the Committee for
Industrial Organization that such a system would not work well for industrial workers,
they withdrew from the AFL and formed the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO).
CIO leaders quickly established the United Automobile Workers Union, the
Steelworkers Union, the Rubber Workers Union, and the Electrical Workers Union, and
these new entities began to organize the manufacturing facilities in their respective
industries. Although many employers initially opposed union organization, both the new
Labor Board and strong union efforts overcame employer opposition. The vast majority
of industrial workers desired a collective voice, and they selected industrial unions to
represent them. From the enactment of the NLRA in 1935 until the Taft-Hartley Act
amendments in 1947, labor organizations could obtain Labor Board certification through
either secret ballot elections or “any other suitable method” to determine if a majority or
workers in an appropriate bargaining unit desired a collective voice. In many cases, once
it became clear that a majority of employees in particular bargaining units had signed
authorization cards designating specific unions as their bargaining agents, employers
voluntarily extended recognition to those labor organizations without the need to utilize
the Labor Board election process.
During the 1940s and 1950s, competition between AFL and CIO affiliates was
significant, and private sector union membership grew from 15 percent in 1935 to 35
percent in 1955.6 At that time, AFL and CIO unions decided to reunite in the AFL-CIO.7
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Despite recent predictions by some persons opposed to changes in the current labor laws
suggesting that increased union membership would greatly increase unemployment, the
U.S. did not experience such a problem when unions represented over one-third of the
labor force. What we did see during that period was a willingness of employers to share
firm success with workers in the form of generous wages and fringe benefits, creating a
sizable blue-collar middle class. Nonetheless, corporate leaders were becoming
concerned about diminishing profits caused by increased labor costs generated through
the collective bargaining process.8 As a result, a growing number of unorganized firms
decided to work harder to prevent the unionization of their employees.
American business leaders also engaged in political activity to limit the rights and
economic power possessed by labor organizations and their supporters. In 1947, they
induced Congress to enact the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) 9 amendments
to the NLRA. These statutory changes prohibited a number of unfair labor practices by
labor organizations, and restricted the capacity of unions to employ secondary activity to
enhance their bargaining power vis-à-vis primary employers. The LMRA amendments
ended the right of the Labor Board to certify bargaining agents except through secret
ballot elections, and eliminated the ability of labor organizations to control the supply of
labor through closed shop agreements that required employers to hire only persons
7
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already members of unions.10 Under the LMRA amendments, new employees could only
be required to become union “members” after the thirtieth day of their employment,11 and
such individuals were only obliged to become “financial core” members – they had to
tender the initiation fee and monthly dues, but did not have to become actual union
members. 12
Business groups induced Congress to further narrow worker and union rights in
the 1959 Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA)13 amendments to
the NLRA. These statutory changes expanded the scope of proscribed secondary activity
and outlawed many forms of organizational and recognitional picketing. 14 The LMRDA
also regulated internal union affairs, required the filing of annual financial reports with
the Department of Labor, and imposed fiduciary obligations on union officials.
Corporate opposition to unions grew more expeditiously during the inflationary
years of the 1970s, as cost-of-living adjustment provisions in bargaining agreements
required employers to raise wages in proportion to increases in the consumer price index.
Many firms demanded concession bargaining that forced labor organizations to accept
wage and benefit reductions, while others transferred production to lower wage areas
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within the U.S. and abroad. Even organized employers began to explore ways to induce
their employees to decertify incumbent bargaining representatives.
Although the absolute number of union members increased from 17,000,000 in
the mid-1950s to 22,000,000 in 1980, the percentage of non agricultural labor force
participants in unions declined from 35 to 23 percent due to the fact that union
membership growth did not keep pace with more rapidly expanding labor force growth.15
During the 1980s and 1990s, union membership declined both in absolute terms and as a
percentage of the nonagricultural labor force. Today, there are only 16.1 million union
members, comprising 12.4 percent of labor force participants. 16 This figure actually
masks the continuing decline in private sector union membership, because it includes the
36.8 percent of public sector employees who are union members. When only private
sector workers are included, the proportion of workers in unions declines to a mere 7.6
percent.
Various factors have contributed to the significant decline in private sector union
membership. 17 Many manufacturing employees have been displaced by automation and
the transfer of production jobs to low wage countries like China. The transformation of
the American economy from blue-collar manufacturing jobs to white-collar and service
jobs has also eroded areas of traditional union strength. These factors have depleted the
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ranks of major industrial unions like the Auto Workers, the Steelworkers, the Electrical
Workers, and the Chemical Workers.
Does the decline in union membership over the past several decades indicate that
employees no longer wish to be represented by labor organizations? The answer is “no.”
A recent study by Professors Richard Freeman and Joel Rogers found that 87 percent of
workers would still like to have some form of collective influence with respect to firm
decisions that affect their employment terms and job security.18 They appreciate the fact
that as at-will employees who can be terminated by their employers at any time for
almost any reason that does not contravene established civil rights laws or significant
public policies they possess no meaningful bargaining power vis-à-vis their corporate
employers. They merely possess the “exit voice” – i.e., they can leave their present
employers if they are dissatisfied with their working conditions. Employees recognize the
need for a collective voice to influence their employment situations, since changing their
employment positions is not an easy task.
If the vast majority of private sector employees would like a collective voice, why
have they failed to select bargaining agents to further their interests? They fear employer
retaliation if they take such action. Corporate employers are vehemently opposed to
unionization. They often retain the services of labor relations consultants or aggressive
law firms to oppose union organizing campaigns. Employers may post anti-union
messages on firm bulletin boards, send anti-union messages to employees via company email systems, include anti-union statements in employee pay envelopes, and express their
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anti union sentiments at “captive audience” speeches which employees may be required
to attend. Employers may apply additional pressure by having supervisors talk with small
groups of workers about the negative effects of unionization. Although employers may
not threaten workers about the possible adverse effects of unionization, they may make
“predictions” regarding the likely negative consequences of union selection.19
Union organizers do not have the same channels of communication open to them.
They do not have access to company bulletin boards, e-mail systems, and pay envelopes.
They are generally not permitted to respond to employer captive audience presentations.
They can only gain access to firm premises if there are no external communication
channels available to them.20 While supervisors can disseminate their anti-union
messages during actual work time, pro-union employees can only spread their messages
when they and other workers are on break.21
Unscrupulous employers often terminate visible union supporters during
organizing campaigns. 22 Such overt anti-union conduct generally sends a chilling
message to other employees who are contemplating support for organizing unions. The
individuals who have been unlawfully discharged are unlikely to be ordered reinstated for
a year or two. By then, their remaining colleagues have often voted against unionization,
fearing that their selection of bargaining agents would seriously jeopardize their
19
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continued employment security. The only monetary remedy for such illegal terminations
involves back pay awards, and the fired persons have a duty to mitigate their losses
during the litigation process before the Labor Board, reducing the final cost to their
employers.
Even when labor organizations are able to counteract employer anti-union efforts
and gain Labor Board certification, they are not guaranteed bargaining success. The
employers involved are only obliged to meet with such unions at reasonable times and
seriously discuss the wages, hours, and employment conditions of the relevant
employees. They are not required to make concessions or to reach agreements. 23 As long
as they appear to be bargaining in good faith, they can extend the negotiation process
indefinitely without tangible results. Even if unions file unfair labor practice charges
challenging the good faith nature of their actions, it can take one or two years for final
decisions to be issued, and the most they have to fear are cease and desist orders directing
them to return to the bargaining table in good faith. There are no monetary remedies
imposed upon employers who engage in bad faith bargaining.24 In over forty percent of
cases newly certified unions are unable to achieve first contracts.25 Once it appears to the
employees who selected representative unions that those entities are impotent,
decertification petitions are often filed and the responsible unions are defeated.
23
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Labor supporters in Congress have proposed the Employee Free Choice Act
(EFCA) to level the playing field and provide workers with the opportunity to select
union representation without significant interference from anti-union employers.26 The
three principal sections of this statute would: (1) authorize the Labor Board to certify
unions as bargaining agents once a majority of employees have signed authorization
cards; (2) permit the Labor Board to award treble damage awards when employees are
unlawfully terminated during union organizing campaigns; and (3) require mediation and
then binding arbitration of first contracts when the negotiating parties are unable to
achieve agreements on their own.
Business leaders are vehemently opposed to the card-check certification provision
and the first contract arbitration mandate, and they are working diligently to prevent the
enactment of the EFCA in its current form. If labor union officials and Democratic
supporters of the EFCA refuse to consider possible modifications that might enable them
to obtain a cloture vote in the Senate, it is doubtful an actual vote on the merits will
result. This article will explore the different provisions of the EFCA and will propose
modifications that might make that proposed law more palatable to employers.
II.

CARD CHECK CERTIFICATION
Many opponents of the EFCA card check certification provisions assert that true

industrial democracy can only be preserved by way of traditional secret ballot elections.
They equate Labor Board representation elections with general political elections, failing
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to acknowledge the undue influence possessed by employers compared to federal, state,
and local politicians. When individuals vote in political elections, they do not fear that the
outcomes of those elections may directly threaten their future job security. On the other
hand, many employers opposing union organizing campaigns expressly or implicitly
suggest to their employees prior to Labor Board elections that if unions are selected as
bargaining agents, those workers may lose their jobs due to increased labor costs. It
should thus be clear that Labor Board elections are not free from such external influence.
When I speak to EFCA opponents who extol the virtue of secret ballot elections,
they become quite upset when I suggest that the salaries and bonuses paid to corporate
executives should be subject to secret ballot elections by shareholders. While they
maintain that secret ballot elections should be required for employees considering the
selection of bargaining agents, they do not believe that shareholders should possess the
right to vote in secret ballot elections on issues of corporate significance. These persons
seem to think that unions have never been allowed to obtain Labor Board certification
except through secret ballot elections. They fail to appreciate the fact that the original
NLRA authorized the certification of labor organizations based upon signed authorization
cards from 1935 until 1947 without significant difficulties.
Supporters of the EFCA maintain that the Labor Board election process is tainted
by employer economic power used to intimidate employees who support union
campaigns. They assert that reliance upon authorization cards would provide a fairer way
to determine if a majority of workers truly desire union representation. EFCA opponents,
however, suggest that some individuals may be induced to sign union authorization cards
through overt coercion or more subtle forms of social pressure. Overt coercion is clearly
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unlawful and would contravene Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA, 27 which prohibits
actions by labor organizations that would interfere with the statutorily protected rights of
employees. As a result, such behavior rarely occurs. Although it is true that some workers
may feel social pressure to sign authorization cards if many of their coworkers support
union organizing drives, such social pressure is unlikely to be as significant as the fear of
job losses union supporters might have if unions win Labor Board elections. Due to their
economic dependence on continued employment, employees tend to be far more
influenced by coercive employer tactics than by improper union actions.
Employer groups have challenged the EFCA based upon the claim that unions
would be able to obtain authorization card signatures from employees before targeted
employers could explain the negative aspects of union representation. Some EFCA
supporters have suggested that employers have no right to disseminate their views of
unions during organizing campaigns, but such assertions ignore two critical
considerations. First, corporate employers enjoy First Amendment free speech rights,28
and have the right to express their anti-union opinions. Second, employees have the right
to appreciate both the pros and cons of unionization. Labor organizers do an excellent job
of communicating the benefits they think workers can derive from collective
representation. Individual employees opposed to unionization lack any formal platform to
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express their sentiments. If such viewpoints are to be disseminated in an effective
manner, targeted employers must be given the opportunity to communicate their opinions
to employees being organized.
Employer groups have challenged the EFCA based upon the claim that unions
would be able to obtain authorization card signatures from employees before targeted
employers could explain the negative aspects of union representation. Most employers
learn fairly early about incipient union campaigns from their own employees who
mention such drives to supervisory personnel. Nonetheless, labor organizations would
still have several days to obtain signatures before employers could gear up their antiunion campaigns and express their sentiments to their employees. To offset this factor,
Congress could include a provision in the EFCA that would require labor organizations
seeking to obtain bargaining rights through authorization cards to notify targeted
employers – and the appropriate regional offices of the Labor Board – of their planned
campaigns. The statute could provide that only authorization cards signed after
employers have received such notice would be considered when determining whether to
extend bargaining rights to the unions involved. To avoid the improper forward-dating of
cards actually signed by persons prior to such employer notification, labor organizations
could be required to obtain Labor Board imprints in the cards they plan to use when they
initially notify the Labor Board office of anticipated organizing campaigns.
In exchange for the right to be notified of incipient union organizing campaigns,
Congress might consider the recent proposal by Representative Joe Sestak (D. Pa.) that
would require employers to provide unions with the same means of communication being

13
used by employers opposing union campaigns. 29 This approach would allow employees
to hear the pros and cons of unionization from both sides, on a relatively equal basis. If
employers decide to give captive audience speeches, union supporters would have the
right to respond at such sessions. If employers communicate anti-union messages on
bulletin boards, e-mail sites, or in documents included in worker pay envelopes, union
organizers would have the right to use those same communication channels. If employers
have supervisory personnel communicate anti-union sentiments during work hours, union
supporters should enjoy the same privilege. It should be difficult for persons who believe
in true industrial democracy to argue that employers should be able to use such means of
communication without extending similar privileges to union supporters.
Individuals opposed to card check certifications maintain that since some
authorization card signers may have been induced to sign such cards due to overt
coercion or more subtle social pressure, bargaining rights may be extended to labor
organizations that do not actually possess majority employee support. How might this
concern be ameliorated? Congress could modify the current EFCA bill to require a
weighted majority before bargaining rights could be extended by the Labor Board
pursuant to authorization card showings. Unions could be required to sign up 60 or 67
percent of individuals in particular bargaining units before certification could be
approved. Such an approach would greatly diminish the likelihood that bargaining rights
would be extended to unions that did not actually possess majority worker support.
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Members of Congress who still believe that only secret ballot elections should be
used to grant certification to labor organizations should consider two alternatives. First,
statutory provisions could impose monetary fines on employers who threaten union
supporters during representation campaigns. At the present time, the only remedy for
such conduct consists of cease and desist orders directing offending employers to refrain
from such behavior in the future. Meaningful fines would have an appropriate deterrent
effect. Second, a provision requiring the Labor Board to conduct representation elections
within five or ten days after election petitions are filed would be beneficial. This is the
practice followed by labor laws in several Canadian provinces.30 Such an approach would
significantly shorten the fifty to sixty days most employers currently have to engage in
anti-union campaigning prior to Labor Board elections. 31 Both employers and labor
organizations would have sufficient time to disseminate their pro or anti union messages,
and such expedited elections would decrease the ability of employers to coerce potential
voters through express or implicit job loss statements.
Senators Arlen Specter and Mark Pryor have been contemplating an alternative
approach that might satisfy the concerns of both sides. They would authorize the Labor
Board to conduct certification elections by way of mail-in ballots. To satisfy union
demands for a more expeditious certification determination process, the Labor Board
could be required to send out the mail-in ballots immediately after labor organizations
have petitioned for certification. This could provide election results within ten days after
petitions have been filed. It would also assuage employer concerns regarding employee
30
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free choice, by allowing employees to decide whether to vote for or against union
representation in the secrecy of their own homes.
III.

TREBLE DAMAGE AWARDS FOR UNLAWFULLY TERMINATED UNION
SUPPORTERS
The most potent weapon available to anti-union employers involves the overt

discharge of open union supporters. Such conduct has an immediate chilling effect, and it
discourages other employees from engaging in public acts supporting organizing
campaigns. At the present time, illegally terminated workers have only two Labor Board
remedies. After one or two years of unfair labor practice litigation before administrative
law judges, the Labor Board, and courts of appeals, such persons are awarded back pay
covering their periods of unemployment and the responsible employers are directed to
offer them reinstatement to their former positions. By this time, the fired individuals have
suffered both emotional and economic losses, and their former colleagues have been
greatly intimidated.
A provision in the proposed EFCA would authorize the Labor Board to award
treble damages to union supporters unlawfully discharged during union organizing
drives. Such a remedy would have two benefits. The additional money involved would
help to compensate the adversely affected persons for their lost earnings and the
emotional distress they have sustained, and it would have a greater deterrent impact on
employers considering such actions than the mere awarding of back pay.
What else could Congress do to ameliorate the significant impact of unlawful
terminations of union supporters – and eliminate or at least ameliorate the need for
increased monetary penalties in such situations? It could amend the NLRA to require the
Labor Board to petition district courts for temporary restraining orders directing the
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immediate reinstatement of individuals the Board believes have been clearly discharged
because of their protected actions supporting union organizing campaigns. They are thus
returned to their work environments while the unfair labor practice proceedings unfold.
At the present time, the Labor Board is obliged to seek such mandatory injunctive relief
under Section 10(l) 32 when labor organizations engage in secondary activity in violation
of Section 8(b)(4)33 or organizational or recognitional picketing in violation of Section
8(b)(7).34 On the other hand, when employers commit unfair labor practices, the Labor
Board may seek preliminary injunctions under Section 10(j)35 to maintain the status quo
while the actual unfair labor practice charges are being litigated. The Board uses its 10(j)
injunctive remedy sparingly. This is why it takes so long for discriminatees to obtain
reinstatement orders. If Congress were to add Section 8(a)(3) discharges to Section 10(l),
unlawfully terminated union supporters would gain expeditious reinstatement. This
would be highly beneficial for those individuals, and it would minimize the continuing
negative impact of their public terminations on their coworkers.
IV.

FIRST CONTRACT ARBITRATION
The most controversial provisions in the EFCA are those pertaining to labor

organizations that have been certified by way of card checks or secret ballot elections but
that have been unable to obtain initial contracts through the collective bargaining process.
If no agreement is reached within ninety days, under the EFCA the Federal Mediation
32
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and Conciliation Service is to provide neutral facilitation services. If after thirty days of
mediation no agreement is obtained, the matter is to be resolved through binding interest
arbitration. The employer and the labor organization would present their economic data
and relevant arguments to either a single arbitrator or a three member arbitration panel
that would be empowered to determine the initial wages, hours, fringe benefits, and
working conditions to govern the parties’ initial year.
One preliminary matter should be considered that could reduce the number of
cases that might be sent to arbitration. When unions are now certified by way of secret
ballot Labor Board elections, the affected employers often refuse to acknowledge the
validity of the Board certification orders. They refuse to bargain with the newly certified
labor organizations, forcing those entities to seek relief through Section 8(a)(5) 36 refusal
to bargain charges. It can take a year or two for these cases to be resolved through
administrative law judge, Labor Board, and Court of Appeal proceedings. By that time,
employees who supported unionization have become cynical regarding the efficacy of
NLRA protections, and the representative unions have begun to view the dilatory
employers quite negatively. As a result, when the parties finally sit down to bargain, the
setting is quite contentious. The likelihood they will successfully negotiate first contracts
is slight.
What might Congress do to minimize the impact of such frequently unmeritorious
delays? It could amend Section 10(l) to require the Labor Board to seek temporary
restraining orders directing employers to recognize and bargain with newly certified labor
organizations while the Section 8(a)(5) charges are being litigated, whenever the Board
36
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has preliminarily determined that the employers are engaged in clearly unjustified
refusals to honor the union certifications. If employers were required to bargain with
unions immediately following their Labor Board certifications, the likelihood that
contracts could be obtained through the collective bargaining process would increase.
This would obviate the need for first contract arbitration.
If the first contract arbitration provision is retained in the EFCA, economically
weak labor organizations may decide that they have nothing to lose by invoking such
procedures. Since it would be difficult to imagine arbitrators awarding unions benefits
less beneficial than those being offered by employers at the bargaining table, union
leaders could reasonably believe that arbitral procedures would have to generate benefits
above those offered by the employers. As a result, the availability of interest arbitration
would diminish the probability that unions would bargain in complete good faith
following their initial certifications.
If first contract arbitration is to be employed to resolve bargaining failures after
120 days, what standards should be imposed on the final arbiters? Should they be
authorized to dictate any initial terms they think appropriate or should their discretion be
circumscribed? It is difficult for me to imagine external arbitrators determining the
specific wages, fringe benefits, hours, and working conditions to cover newly unionized
employees. Should they adopt standards consistent with other similar firms in the U.S. or
the immediate geographical area or should they consider the practices of local firms in
diverse lines of work? What health care and pension coverage should be imposed? What
forms of union security should they mandate? What management rights clauses should be
included? If Congress decides to include a first contract arbitration provision in the

19
EFCA, it should include something to constrain arbitrator discretion. It should require
arbitrators to choose between the final offers tendered by the employers and labor
organizations based upon the reasonableness of the relevant terms. This could be done on
a total contract basis or on an issue-by-issue basis. I would suggest the issue-by-issue
approach to enable arbitrators to select – issue-by-issue – the more reasonable of the
proposals advanced by labor and management. This approach would encourage
bargaining parties to make reasonable proposals to each other, which might obviate the
need for arbitration. When mutual accords could not be achieved, this procedure would
limit the economic discretion possessed by arbitrators.
For members of Congress who find binding interest arbitration too extreme a
dispute resolution mechanism, they might consider non-binding arbitration where
arbitrators would conduct hearings, determine the relevant facts, and make non-binding,
but public, recommendations to the parties. The labor and management representatives
would then return to the bargaining table. The public arbitral findings and suggestions
would put pressure on the negotiating parties to seek agreements in line with the arbitral
recommendations.
V.

CONCLUSION
The NLRA no longer protects the rights of employees who desire union

representation. Despite the fact the vast majority of workers would like some form of
collective voice to counterbalance the economic power possessed by their corporate
employers, most have been unable to achieve such representation. Employers have a
substantial advantage over organizing unions due to both their economic power and the
fact they have unlimited means to communicate their anti-union messages to employees.

20
Business success is attributable to three critical groups: (1) the shareholders who provide
the investment capital; (2) the managers who direct the business; and (3) the employees
who produce the goods or services. Over the past several decades, rank-and-file workers
have become the junior partners in firm success, but the junior partners in firm failure.37
Congress should seriously consider some form of EFCA that would level the
playing field and guarantee employees the right to select bargaining representatives if
they wish to have a collective voice.
The use of authorization cards to obtain union certification would make it easier
for labor unions to organize employees. To minimize the impact of union coercion or
social pressure, unions could be required to sign up 60 or 67 percent of unit personnel
before they could be certified. To guarantee union supporters an equal opportunity to
spread their pro-union message, employers could be required to provide union supporters
with the same means of communication they employ to spread their anti-union messages.
If Congress continues to believe in the sanctity of secret ballot elections, they could
amend the NLRA to require the Labor Board to conduct representation elections within
five or ten days after election petitions are filed. This might even be accomplished by
directing the Labor Board to use mail-in ballots that could be sent to eligible employees
shortly after certification petitions have been filed.
To limit the tendency of employers to unlawfully terminate open union supporters
during organizing campaigns, Congress could authorize treble back pay awards to
persons fired in this manner. They could alternatively amend Section 10(l) to require the
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Labor Board to seek preliminary injunctive relief reinstating individuals who appear to
have been discharged illegally while their unfair labor practice proceedings unfold.
Congress could similarly amend Section 10(l) to require the Labor Board to seek such
preliminary injunctive relief in cases where unions have obtained certification but the
employers have refused to honor those certifications. Such firms would be directed to
recognize and bargain with the newly certified labor organizations while the underlying
refusal to bargain charges are being litigated.
The most controversial part of the EFCA involves the provisions that would
mandate first contract arbitration after 120 days of unsuccessful bargaining. This would
constitute a significant change in existing American labor law and it would ignore the
fact that newly certified unions often fail to obtain first contracts. To limit arbitral
discretion if these procedures are adopted, Congress should direct arbiters to select
between the final offers of labor and management on an issue-by-issue basis. They could
alternatively require only non-binding arbitration in which the arbitrators would decide
the underlying factual and economic issues and make public recommendations the parties
would not be obliged to accept, but would have to consider when they returned to the
bargaining table.

